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RESTRICTIONS ON STUDENT VOTING:
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANACHRONISM?
I. INTRODUCTION
"One man, one vote" is a shorthand phrase for the principle
that in a democracy each citizen has the right to participate
equally in the electoral process. By its recent extension of the
franchise1 to eleven and a half million new eighteen to twenty-one
year old voters,2 Congress has paid tacit tribute to the political
concern and awareness of a large segment of the nation's youth by
offering them the ballot box as a vehicle for political action.3
Although the Supreme Court recently restricted this grant of the
franchise to congressional and national elections, 4 many public
officials believe that the inconvenience and inevitable confusion of
maintaining dual registration and voting procedures will move
many states to enact eighteen year old vote laws in the interests of
administrative uniformity. 5
As many as four million of the newly enfranchised group will
be potential college student voters in 1972.6 Many of them will
then encounter for the first time a situation that has plagued
thousands of their predecessors: the inability to register for or
vote in local elections in the county or city where they are
residing while attending college. In at least twenty-four states, 7
through a process of judicial interpretation of vague election stat-
utes or through legislative fiat,8 local officials can and do deny the
student an opportunity to vote on the candidates and issues that
will substantially affect his daily life.
1 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1973aa-73bb (Supp. 1971),
amending the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 19 7 3-73p (Supp. V, 1965) and
enacting subchapter I-C which lowers the voting age to eighteen for all federal, state and
local elections.
2 N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1970, at 1, col. 8.
3 Denno, Politics, The Constitution and the Eighteen-Year-Old Vote, 35 ALBANY L.
REV. 1 (1970).
4 United States v. Arizona, 91 S.Ct. 260 (1970).
5 N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1970, at 1, col. 8; 32, col. 2. The Senate has already unani-
mously approved a proposed constitutional amendment that would lower the voting age to
eighteen in all elections. Backers of the amendment believe it can be ratified by the states
before the elections of November, 1972. N.Y. Times, Mar. i1, 1971, at 1, col. 6. On
March 23, 197 1, the House of Representatives approved the amendment by a vote of four
hundred to nineteen. N.Y. Tim es, Mar. 24, 1971, at 1, col. 1.6 N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1970, at 16, col. 4.7 See compilation in Singer, Student Power at the Polls, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 721-23
(1970) [hereinafter cited as SINGER].
8 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1971, at 44, col. 3.
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Using Michigan as a vehicle for analysis because it has a
student voting process representative of many states,9 this note
seeks to accomplish four purposes: (1) an examination of the case
law often underlying the presumption against student registra-
bility; (2) an analysis of recent constitutional developments in the
due process and equal protection areas as they relate to the
particular problems posed by the student voter; (3) a survey of the
competing local and student interests in the student vote issue;
and (4) a conclusion regarding the likelihood that thwarted student
voters can follow the paths of other disfranchised groups such as
black citizens who have successfully achieved the unqualified
right to vote.
II. MICHIGAN LAW-
A PRESUMPTION AGAINST STUDENT VOTING
State law prohibiting or discouraging student voter registration
in college communities traces back to the nineteenth century
when colleges were small, cloistered affairs. Typically, such "res-
idency-determinative" 10 statutes provide that no person shall
"lose or gain" a residence for voting registration purposes while
attending an institution of learning. 1' Ironically, the original pur-
pose of these laws may have been as much to preserve students'
voting rights in the city or county of their parents' residence as it
was to prevent voting in the college community.' 2 In a number of
important respects, Michigan is typical of at least twenty-four
states' 3 where the courts have read into the "gained or lost"
provisions various notions of public policy. This has created a
virtual de facto exclusion of student registrants from the rolls of
college communities' 4 or at least made the registration process
difficult and uncertain.
Michigan's current statutory provision concerning voting by
9 See SINGER 721-23.
10 Residency-determinative statutes as analyzed in this note are to be distinguished from
durational residency requirements which set out the length of time an elector must reside
in a particular state or locality to be eligible to vote at the next regular or special election,
e.g., MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 168.492 (Supp. 1970).
11See, e.g., N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 151 (McKinney 1964).
12 "[Tjhe section was designed for the benefit of and to enlarge and protect the rights of
these classes, not to deprive them of privileges common to all." Wolcott v. Holcomb, 97
Mich. 361,371, 56 N.W. 837, 841 (1893) (dissenting opinion).
13 See SINGER 721-23.
14 Harris v. Samuels, Civil No. 68-598 (N.D. Ala., Feb. 9, 1970), rev'd, Civil No. 29683
(5th Cir., Mar. 16, 1971), discussed infra note 51. Cf. Wilkins v. Ann Arbor City Clerk, 24
Mich. App. 422, 180 N.W.2d 395 (1970), motion for leave to appeal granted, 384 Mich.
782 (1970). Trial and intermediate appellate courts upheld the Michigan statutory pre-
sumption with regard to residency for voting purposes (infra note 15) as a valid exercise of
legislative power in the interest of preserving purity of the ballot box.
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students reads: "No elector shall be deemed to have gained or
lost a residence ... while a student at any institute of learning.' 15
Voter registration takes place on the local level; thus the effect of
this law on student voter registration varies from city to city,
since the statute is silent regarding standards for student voter
residency at the college town. Moreover, Michigan judicial deci-
sions interpreting the law have not provided local registration
officials with the clear guidelines necessary for determining
whether individual students have attained voter status at their
respective university seats. In sharp contradistinction to the stu-
dent voting provision, the state law defining voting residence for
all other citizens is clear and unequivocal:
The term 'residence,' as used in this act, for registration and
voting purposes shall be construed to mean that place at
which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal
effects and has a regular place of lodging. Should a person
have more than one residence, or should a wife have a resi-
dence separate from that of the husband, that place at which
such person resides the greater part of the time shall be his or
her official residence for the purposes of this act. 16
But for the "gained or lost" stipulation, 17 full-time students would
be able to vote in their college communities since that is where
they reside "the greater part of the time."' 8
Michigan cases reaching the problem of student residence for
15 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 168.1 1(b) (1967).
No elector shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of
his being employed in the service of the United States or of this state, nor
whie engaged in the navigation of the waters of this state or of the United
States or of the high seas, nor while a student at any institution of learning,
nor while kept at any almshouse or other asylum at public expense, nor while
confined in any public prison. Honorably discharged members of the armed
forces of the United States or of this state and who reside in the veterans'
facility established by this state may acquire a residence were the facility is
located.
For sailors, this provision was obviously intended only to save their right to vote at their
prior residence. Prisoners and wards of the state clearly contribute nothing and are not
concerned with the local laws, taxes, and policies of the locality where they are in-
stitutionalized.
'6 MICH. COMp. LAWS § 168.1 l(a) (1967). The state constitution is the source of the
legislative power to define voting residence. "Every citizen of the United States who has
attained the age of 21 years, who has resided in this state six months, and who meets the
requirements of local residence provided by law, shall be an elector .... The legislature
shall define residence for voting purposes." MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
'
7 Supra note 15.
18 In fact, it appears that full-time students would have to vote at their college residences
because the saving aspect of MICH. COMp. LAWS §168.11(b), which allows them to
continue voting at their prior residences, would be lost. This is because the students would
no longer qualify as residents of their parents' localities as they would no longer reside
there "the greater part of the time."
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voting purposes have all dealt with whether the student had
"gained" residence. The net effect of this litigation has been the
creation of a presumption against the student's having a voting
residence at the place where he lives while going to school. As is
often the case in the absence of clear statutory or judicial stan-
dards, considerable discretion now resides in the registration
clerks as to the nature and degree of evidence necessary to rebut
the presumption.
The Michigan Supreme Court first considered the "gained or
lost" provision with respect to local residence for voting purposes
in Wolcott v. Holcomb.19 The court held that a veteran residing in
a state soldier's home was absolutely prevented from establishing
a voting residence in the county where the home was situated.
However bona fide his intent to establish a voting residence, the
veteran lacked the requisite degree of community involvement:
The inmates of the home own no property, pay no local taxes,
do no work in or for the benefit of the municipality, and have
no pecuniary interest in its local affairs. In fact, they have no
connection with, and stand in no relation to, the local munici-
pal government. They occupy State property, and are ex-
clusively under the control and management of the State.20
Applying this same standard of a sufficient nexus with the local
community, the court in dictum articulated reservations regarding
students' right to gain a voting residence in their college towns:
Furthermore, students in all institutions of learning, although
they are in attendance there for the sole purpose of obtaining
an education, might, at their own will, become electors in the
places where such institutions are located. We think the con-
stitution prohibits a change of residence under such circum-
stances, and that, when one's presence in any of the in-
stitutions named is due to the sole purpose of receiving the
benefits conferred, his former residence must be considered
his domicile for citizenship. 21
Nineteen years later the Michigan court, in deciding People v.
Osborn,22 modified its position. The court acknowledged the pos-
sibility that a student could, in certain circumstances, become a
1997 Mich. 361, 56 N.W. 837 (1893). The Wolcott decision with respect to veterans
was overruled by the 1908 Michigan Constitution which established an exception to the
"gained or lost" provision for honorably discharged servicemen residing at a state facility.
MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 2 (1908).
2097 Mich. at 364-65, 56 N.W. at 838.
21 Id. at 368, 56 N.W. at 839.
22 170 Mich. 143, 135, N.W. 921 (1912).
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voting resident of the city in which his college was situated. In
Osborn, a twenty-seven year old college student at Albion, Mich-
igan, who had lived in Albion for several years while working his
way through school, was criminally prosecuted and convicted for
illegally voting in Albion where he claimed to have gained resi-
dence for voting purposes. The court did not consider itself bound
by Wolcott, which was interpreted to include within the prohibi-
tion against students' voting only those students whose "sole
purpose" in residing at a particular place was to attend an in-
stitution of learning. 23 While reversing on grounds of improper
jury instructions, the court nonetheless admitted both the possi-
bility of a student's gaining and losing a residence along with his
parents (should they move while he were attending college) and
the possibility that Osborn might have become a resident before
matriculating. Far from clearing the way for massive student voter
registration, the court stated that a student attending college could
not, simply by a declaration of intention, become an elector in the
community in which the college was located. However, "if re-
spondent, having no domicile, in good faith made a domicile at
Albion, entering college as a resident citizen of Albion, he was
entitled to vote there. Whether he did so is a question of fact."
2 4
In its most recent pronouncement on the "gained or lost"
provision with respect to students, the Michigan Supreme Court
in Attorney General ex rel. Miller v. Miller25 continued the trend
toward cautious flexibility. In dictum, the court quoted with ap-
proval from 20 Corpus Juris 72:
The great weight of authority is that, 'a student at college who
is free from parental control, regards the place where the
college is situated as his home, has no other to which to
return in case of sickness or domestic affliction, is as much
entitled to vote as any other resident of the place where the
college is situated.' 26
On the other hand, the court reiterated the position taken in
Osborn that a mere declaration of intent to reside where the
student is going to school will not suffice for establishing res-
idency. Thus the court left unclear just what requirements must
be met before a student may vote in his college community.
23 I-. at 147, 135 N.W. at 922.
24 Id. at 148, 135 N.W. at 923.
25 266 Mich. 127, 253 N.W. 241 (1934). This case involved an election dispute between
two candidates for sheriff. The fifty-eight student votes which were challenged, even if
excluded, would not have affected the outcome.
26 266 Mich. at 143, 253 N.W. at 247.
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Two subsequent opinions by different Michigan Attorneys
General deal with the issue, 27 but fail to provide much additional
guidance. While both quote Osborn to the effect that the student's
intention has nothing to do with his residence for voting purposes,
both also quote extensively from the more liberal standards po-
sited in an A.L.R. citation suggesting that the intention of the
student to remain or return home is the critical factor. 28 Finally,
both opinions state that the determination of whether the "no
elector shall gain" proviso has been overcome is a factual matter
to be decided in each case by the registration clerks:
[lit is impossible for this office to lay down any general rule
applicable to each of the students concerning whom your
inquiry relates. The city and township clerks, as registration
officers, are given statutory authority 29 to interrogate pros-
pective registrants and must in the first instance determine
eligibility for registration.30
Therefore, in Michigan, as well as in other states,31 the standards
which students must meet in order to vote in the locality in which
their college is located are extremely vague.3 2 In Michigan, the
guidelines are so vague as to be tantamount to no standards; thus
each registration clerk determines himself which factors will over-
come the presumption against student registrability in his city.33
Factors which various state courts have considered to be rele-
vant include the following: a student's gainful employment in the
college community,3 4 home ownership with no present intention
of pulling up stakes,3 5 apartment dwelling as head of a family, 36
holding a teaching and research assistantship,3 7 stated intention to
make the university town a home upon graduation,38 year-round
residence,3 9 financial independence from parents, 40 and payment
of local property and income taxes. 41 Since guidelines for identi-
27[1947-1948] MICH. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 0-5115 at 77; [1955-1956] MICH.
ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. Pt. 1, No. 2178 at 339.28 Annot., 37 A.L.R. 138 (1925).
2MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.499 (1967).
300-5 115 supra note 27, at 80; No. 2178 at 341.
31 See infra notes 34-4 I.
32 See generally Note, Election Laws as Legal Roadblocks to Voting, 55 'IA. L. REV.
616 (1970); Jannson, The Student Vote, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 19, 1970, at 11.
33 See sample student voter questionaires, Appendix 1.34 E.g., People v. Osborn, 170 Mich. 143, 135 N.W. 921 (1912).
- E.g., State ex rel. May v. Jones, 16 Ohio App. 2d 140, 242 N.E.2d 672 (Ct. App.
1968).
36 E.g., Robbins v. Chamberlin, 297 N.Y. 108, 75 N.E.2d 617 (1947).
37 E.g., In re Goldhaber, 55 Misc. 2d 111, 285 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1967).
38 E.g., Kegley v. Johnson, 207 Va. 54, 147 S.E.2d 735 (1966).
39 E.g., New v. Corrough, 370 S.W.2d 323 (Mo. 1963).40E.g., Swan v. Bowker. 135 Neb. 405, 281 N.W. 891 (1938).
41 See student voter questionaires, Appendix I.
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fying and weighing relevant criteria for student voter residency
are virtually non-existent, the determination of whether one or
more such factors overcomes the presumption against student
residency vests almost solely in the uncontrolled discretion of
each registrar and his local government superiors. 42
111. CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF STUDENT
VOTER REGISTRATION RESTRICTIONS
A. Vague Voting Registration Criteria
as a Violation of Due Process
The indefiniteness or non-existence of standards for determin-
ing residence raises the possibility of a denial of due process of
law to those students denied local voting privileges by officials
utilizing vague registration standards. In Louisiana v. United
States43 and the earlier case of Schnell v. Davis,4 the United
States Supreme Court struck down state laws that vested local
registration clerks with similar unfettered discretion over voter
qualification. In both cases, state literacy tests requiring prospec-
tive registrants to qualify on the basis of answers given to con-
stitutional interpretation questions were adjudged constitutionally
infirm and enjoined from further use. The Court found particularly
reprehensible the fact that under the state laws voting registrars
could determine the manner and form of the test and the
sufficiency of the answers "without any objective standard to
guide them." 45 Although the voter qualification tests involved
were used to disfranchise blacks, thus bringing into play the
fifteenth as well as the fourteenth amendment, the inherent vague-
ness of the interpretation test and the imprecise criteria used by
the registrars presented prospective black voters with a dilemma
analogous to that faced today by students. Although students
must demonstrate greater attachment to the university locale than
must most other registrants, 46 the quantum of required attachment
is quite unclear. As Justice Black wrote for a unanimous Court in
Louisiana v. United States:
42 Supra note 30.
- 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
"336 U.S. 933, affg 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949). Compare with the numerous
decisions wherein the Supreme Court has required that statutes regulating the exercise of
first amendment freedoms be "precise and narrowly drawn... evincing a legislative judg-
ment that certain specific conduct be limited or proscribed." Edwards v. South Carolina,
372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963) (petitioners' breach of the peace convictions were reversed
where it was shown that they were arrested for a peaceful demonstration on the state
capitol grounds). See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (issuance of speaking
permits must be guided by such exact standards as to be ministerial rather than dis-
cretionary).
I Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 150 (1965).
4See, e.g., Michigan decisiois cited supra notes 19, 22, and 25.
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The cherished right of people in a country like ours to vote
cannot be obliterated by the use of laws like this, which leave
the voting fate of a citizen to the passing whim or impulse of
an individual registrar. Many of our cases have pointed out
the invalidity of laws so completely devoid of standards and
restraints. 47
Clearly, the Court regarded state laws which vested full discretion
in voting registrars to determine qualifications, but which failed to
set forth definite and objective standards for the registrars' guid-
ance, to be repugnant to traditional notions of fourteenth amend-
ment due process. Similarly, vague and indefinite laws denying the
out-of-town or out-of-state student the exercise of his franchise
are arguably as susceptible to challenge on due process grounds
as were those laws denying the black voter the franchise on the
basis of ill-defined voter qualification tests. In both situations, the
lack of criteria as to voter qualifications and the resultant un-
checked authority of registrars served to deprive potential voters
of their right to exercise the franchise. Thus the students seeking
to register may have due process grounds on which to challenge
state restrictions on student voting.
B. Exclusion of Students from the Local Franchise
as a Denial of Equal Protection
1. The Compelling State Interest Test and the Right to Vote-
Because the franchise is "close to the core of our constitutional
system" 48 and "the essence of a democratic society... the heart
of representative government," 49 the Supreme Court has treated
the right to vote free of restraints on a constitutional par with the
other specially protected fundamental rights.
But Michigan's interpretation of the "gained or lost" provision
amounts to a presumption against students achieving voting res-
idency status in their college communities. In effect, this places on
students a burden of demonstrating a sufficient nexus with the
locality. A similar burden is not placed on older citizens, on young
citizens native to that locality, or on nonstudent members of the
community. Where students fail to carry the extra burden, they
lose the right to vote at their college residences. Although a body
47 380 U.S. at 153.4 8 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
4 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). See also 561-62 where the Court stated:
"Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired
manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of
the right to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."
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of state case law exists on the issue of student voting,50 only
recently have students challenged voter registration laws on the
basis of denial of equal protection. 51
In cases not involving individual liberties, the customary
fourteenth amendment equal protection analysis presumes that a
challenged legislative classification is valid, with the plaintiff bear-
ing "the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any rational
basis, but is essentially arbitrary." 52 But "[lines drawn on the
basis of wealth or property, like those of race. . . are traditionally
disfavored." 5 3 When the state classification is based on race or
other disfavored criteria, it is presumed to be invalid, with the
state then assuming the burden of showing some overriding need
for such discrimination. 54
In recent years, the Supreme Court has denied the presumption
of rationality to classification schemes infringing "fundamental
rights," 55 thereby requiring the state to demonstrate an over-
whelming state interest in the legislation. For example, in Bates v.
Little Rock,56 two license tax ordinances requiring organizations
(here the NAACP) to disclose names of members to city officials
were found to violate the fundamental right of freedom of associ-
ation. While admitting that the city's interest in enforcing an
occupational license tax was a cogent one, the Court did not find
the means chosen for enforcement to be reasonably related to the
city's purpose. Thus, "[w]here there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a
subordinating interest which is compelling." 57 The effect of the
50 Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 488 (1964).
51 In Harris v. Samuels, Civil No. 68-598 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 9, 1970), rev'd, Civil No.
!9683 (5th Cir., Mar. 16, 1971), students at the University of Alabama enlisted the help of
the ACLU in challenging Alabama's presumption of non-residence against college stu-
dents as a denial of equal protection. They appealed an adverse trial court judgment to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which reversed and remanded with directions to retain
jurisdiction pending more authoritative construction of the Alabama law by state courts.52 E.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79 (1911). Since New York
had a rational basis for prohibiting waste of mineral waters, legislation limiting the amount
petitioner could draw from a common source of supply did not deprive him of property
without due process of law.
53 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). The equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment was held to bar a state from making payment of a poll
tax a prerequisite to voting.54 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), holding Virginia's antimiscegenation
laws proscribing marriages between white and non-whiite persons violative of both the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
55 The requirement that the state justify statutes making classifications abridging the
fundamental right to vote on the basis of a compelling state interest grew out of the line of
cases beginning with Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Accord, Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
5r 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
57 Id. at 524. Accord, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S.
539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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''compelling interest" test is to thrust upon the state the burden of
proving a major element in an equal protection claim. When a
classification affecting fundamental rights is challenged, the state
must demonstrate strong reasons for the necessity of the classifi-
cation in order to have its constitutionality upheld. 58
In Williams v. Rhodes, 59 the Supreme Court for the first time
clearly articulated the compelling state interest test in an equal
protection, election context. The Court held that the American
Independent Party must be placed on the Ohio ballot despite the
Party's failure to comply with a complex of election laws making
it very difficult for any party other than the Democratic and
Republican to be listed there. Since the two major parties were
given a decided advantage by the Ohio laws, the Court found that
Ohio had placed "substantially unequal burdens on both the right
to vote and the right to associate." 60 Because these rights were
fundamental to the democratic process, "only a compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's con-
stitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment
freedoms."6 1 Ohio claimed that it had a compelling state interest
in ensuring that winning candidates have the support of the major-
ity of voters and in preventing a minority group from winning
elections in a multi-party situation with a mere plurality. 62 How-
ever, the Court rejected Ohio's claim, and held that the state's
interest was insufficient to justify the "severe restrictions in voting
and associational rights" 63 which Ohio had imposed. If it requires
the state to demonstrate a compelling interest in restricting the
ballot, then it would seem to follow that the Court ought to
require the same kind of showing where the state has artificially
restricted the electorate so as to exclude students.
In the early voting apportionment cases, the Court purported to
apply the traditional rational basis equal protection test. So long
as the institutions of state government are presumed to be struc-
tured so as to represent fairly all the people, it might follow that
state classification schemes should be presumed rational. When,
however, the challenge to the statute is in effect a challenge of the
basic assumption, it is no longer reasonable for the assumption to
serve as the basis for presuming constitutionality. 64 Thus in Rey-
58 Note, California's Two-Thirds Majority Requirement for Local Bond Issues: New
Ground for "One Man, One Vote?", 4 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. 309, 316 (1970).
59 393 U.S. 23 (1968).60 1 d. at 3 1.
61 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
62 393 U.S. at 32.
63 Id.
64 Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969). "[W]hen
we are reviewing statutes which deny some residents the right to vote, the general
presumption of constitutionality afforded state statutes and the traditional approval given
state classification if the Court can conceive of a 'rational basis' for the distinctions made
are not applicable."
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nolds v. Sims,6 5 the Court rejected the argument that historical
boundaries and economic or other interest groupings were state
interests sufficiently compelling to justify diluting the votes of
electors in state legislative districts of unequal population. Con-
ceding that the representation of varying political subdivisions
might be a rational state purpose, the Court nevertheless held
such apportionment to be unconstitutional:
But if, even as a result of a clearly rational state policy of
according some legislative representation to political subdivi-
sions, population is submerged as the controlling consid-
eration in the apportionment of seats in the particular legisla-
tive body, then the right of all the State's citizens to cast an
effective and adequately weighted vote would be uncon-
stitutionally impaired. 66 (Emphasis added).
In a number of voting denial cases decided over the past two
years67 the Court has applied the compelling state interest test in
requiring states to demonstrate an overriding necessity for ex-
cluding individuals from the polls in local elections. Almost
uniformly, statutes denying the franchise to a particular class of
citizens have been held to be unconstitutional. Under the logic of
these decisions, it is reasonable to conclude that states must
justify with compelling reasons their exclusion of students, as a
class, from the electorate of those localities where the students
are pursuing their educations. In the first of these cases, Kramer
v. Union Free School District No. 15,68 a New York statute
excluding all non-property owners and non-parents from voting in
local school board elections was held unconstitutional. Under the
statute, a single adult non-property owner, without children and
residing with his parents had been disqualified from voting in his
district school board elections. The Supreme Court held that New
York had failed to show a compelling interest in excluding Kra-
mer from the electorate, and accordingly must allow him to vote.
The state argued that limiting the electorate to those citizens
"primarily affected by or primarily interested in ' 69 the decisions
made by the officials to be elected was a sufficiently compelling
interest. Expressing no opinion as to whether limitation of the
electorate to those "primarily affected" could ever be a com-
pelling state interest, the Court held that the statute did not
achieve that goal with sufficient precision, since some persons
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
66Id. at 581.
67 See notes 68, 71, 73 and 76 infra.
68395 U.S. 621 (1969).
69 Id. at 632.
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who had a direct interest in school board decisions were excluded
while some who had remote interests were included. 70
Like Kramer, the average student, unable to overcome the
presumption against registrability, may find himself excluded from
local elections no matter how passionate his interest in the out-
come and the candidates might be. While the vice of imprecision
in Kramer served to exclude an informed and affected
non-property owner, a similarly imprecise standard permits un-
challenged registration of one whose only nexus with the commu-
nity may be the accident of birth, but excludes interested stu-
dents. Furthermore, by defining local community interest or sub-
stantial local nexus in terms of economic or property criteria,
local voter registrars restrict student voting rights through appli-
cation of financial factors-an analysis specifically rejected in
Kramer.
Statutes which exclude non-taxpayers from the electorate have
also been held constitutionally invalid for lack of exacting pre-
cision and failure to meet the compelling interest requirements. In
Cipriano v. City of Houma71 the Supreme Court held a Louisiana
statute limiting the electorate in a utility revenue bond author-
ization contest to property taxpayers to be a violation of equal
protection. The Court noted that the legislation had the effect of
excluding "otherwise qualified voters who are as substantially
affected and directly interested in the matter voted upon as are
those who are permitted to vote." 72 Apparently, the Court re-
Yarded all the voters in the locality as persons directly concerned
and interested in the outcome of the election, although many
would be affected only as beneficiaries of the contemplated im-
provements. Similarly, in the 1970 case of Phoenix v. Kolodziej-
ski73 the Court found insufficiently compelling Arizona's interest
in excluding non-property taxpayers from voting in an authori-
zation election for general obligation bonds. The state had
grounded its interest in exclusion of non-property taxpayers in the
fac that state law required property taxes to be levied in an
amount sufficient to service general obligation bonds. The issue of
the legitimacy of restricting the franchise to taxpayers was thus
before the Court in its clearest form. The majority opinion stated
that
property owners and nonproperty owners alike have a sub-
stantial interest in the public facilities and services of the city
70 395 U.S. at 632.
71 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
72 Id. at 706.
73 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
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and will be substantially affected by the ultimate outcome of
the bond election at issue in this case. Presumptively, when
all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental
decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not
permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified
citizens from the franchise. 74
Even if other non-property tax revenues were not available to
service the bond issue, the decision noted that a significant part of
the property tax burden would be shifted to tenants and con-
sumers, whose interest and concern with the community were
therefore very real.
The logic of Cipriano and Phoenix is clearly applicable to the
problem presented by the exclusion of student voters. Numerous
otherwise qualified prospective student voters fail to carry the
burden of establishing a nexus with their college communities
because they are unable to adduce such factors as property own-
ership and payment of property taxes. By rejecting these pocket-
book indices as the measure for exclusion of otherwise qualified
voters, 75 the Supreme Court has opened up state presumptions
and restrictions on student residency for voting purposes to
serious equal protection challenge to the extent that they are
premised on these factors.
Evans v. Cornman,76 another voting rights denial case decided
in 1970, perhaps comes closest to dealing with the denial of equal
protection aspects of the student voter problem. In Evans, a
unanimous Supreme Court held that Maryland's withholding of
voting privileges to residents of a "federal reservation" (National
Institutes of Health) unconstitutionally denied them equal protec-
tion. Reserving the question of whether citizens not substantially
interested in or affected by decisions may be excluded from the
electorate, the Court in Evans found that the residents of federal
reservations were substantially affected by state governmental
decisions. Maryland argued that the United States Constitution
provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over federal enclaves
where Congress chooses to exercise it7 7 and to that extent had
removed the National Institutes of Health from the state's juris-
diction. Moreover, since residents of the enclave paid no property
taxes, and since numerous state regulatory and licensing provi-
sions were not enforceable on the reservation, the state argued
74 Id. at 209.
75 As, e.g., those who meet the durational residency requirements for voting eligibility in
a particular locality. See note 10 supra.
76 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
77 U.S. CONST. art. i, § 8, cl. 17.
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that the residents lacked sufficient interest to be entitled to voting
rights. The state's contention that residents of federal enclaves
had less of a nexus with the state than did other residents is
analogous to the argument that students are presumed to lack a
nexus with the university locales in Michigan and other states.
The Court's response to this argument was that "these
differences, along with whatever others may exist, do not come
close to establishing that degree of disinterest in electoral deci-
sions that might justify a total exclusion from the franchise." 78
The Court detailed a number of factors, most of them as appli-
cable to students as to federal enclave residents, which estab-
lished the basis for a finding of substantial interest on the part of
residents in state and local political decisions. These factors point
up the kind of nexus naturally arising between a locality and an
outside group which makes the exclusion of the group from the
local franchise for disinterest in its electoral decisions con-
stitutionally infirm. The Evans analysis applies equally as well to
students as to federal employees living on a reservation. The
factors deemed relevant by the Court serve to highlight student
attachment to those local communities where they spend any-
where from eight to twelve months of the year living and attend-
ing college. 79
First, the Court not6d, enclave residents (like university stu-
dents) were included in the census determination of the state's
congressional apportionment. 8  Second, Congress had provided
that state criminal laws, which went beyond the federal criminal
laws in designating new crimes or greater sanctions, applied to
residents of federal reservations. Similarly, state criminal laws
apply to college students who also come under local court juris-
diction when they are accused of transgression of state and local
statutes. Third, the enclave residents, as do students, paid income
tax on their earnings, and gasoline, sales and use taxes on their
purchases, and these sources accounted for a major share of state
revenue -some of which returns to the localities in the form of
state grants based on population."' Fourth, enclave residents, as is
the case with students, enjoyed no immunity from state judicial
process, and had recourse to the state and local courts. Fifth, the
78 398 U.S. at 426.
79 See discussion of the nature and extent of students' interests in voting at their college
residences in subsection 2 of text infra.
80 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY
DATA BOOK xix (1967); See also Jannson, supra note 32, at 11.
81 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 205.75 (1967) provides that the state shall remit 1/8 of the net
sales tax revenue to counties and cities on a per capita basis. MICH. CoMP. LAWS
§ 247.660 (Supp. 1970) similarly provides that twenty percent of gasoline tax revenue shall
be remitted on a combined population-highway mileage basis.
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children of reservation residents, as do those of resident students,
attended the local schools. Similarly, often students or their wives
take advantage of local adult educational or recreational pro-
grams. In short, under the Evans rationale, students would seem
to have the requisite interest in state affairs to entitle them to
participate in the state, and by inference, the local, political pro-
cesses in the most uniformly meaningful way-by voting.
One recent Supreme Court case that seemingly contradicts the
Evans logic is McDonald v. Board of Commissioners82 in which
the Court denied in-county inmates of Cook County jails being
held pending trial an asserted right to vote. The inmates claimed
that their right to vote was denied because the Illinois absentee
voting law failed to provide for them. The Court declined to apply
the compelling state interest test on the ground that since it was
possible that Illinois provided for their vote in some other man-
ner, the denial of absentee ballots did not in itself deny the
prisoners' right to vote. Thus it could conceivably be argued that
only where a class has been totally disfranchised will the Court
require a state to justify its action on, the basis of some compelling
state interest.
However, two factors distinguish this case from the other Su-
preme Court cases denying the state's power to exclude a class
from the electorate. First, the Court was of opinion that "[i]t is
thus not the right to vote that is at stake but a claimed right to
receive absentee ballots."83 Therefore the Court seemed con-
strained to take an approach less exacting than the compelling
state interest test since the state had not excluded the prisoners
from the franchise. Second, although students residing in a college
community and wishing to vote there may have the option of
voting elsewhere, McDonald does not dispose of the equal protec-
tion question involved in student voter exclusion from the fran-
chise of the college residences. For those students who have
severed their ties to the family residence and whose parents' state
does not have a "gained or lost" statute, the only alternative to
voting at the seat of their university is to not vote at all.8 4 In
addition, the Williams case 85 clearly upholds the voter's right not
to have his ballot artificially restricted by limiting his choice of
candidates to those of the two major parties. The constitutional
82 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
83 Id. at 807.
84 Those students who have truly broken from home and are making their own ways
would no longer satisfy the requirements of the general statutes defining residency for
voting purposes, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.1 I(a) (1967) set out at text accompanying
note 16 supra.
85 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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logic of Williams is clear: the right to participate in the electoral
process is essentially denied where the field of candidates, from
which the voter must choose those who will govern him, is arti-
ficially restricted.
The absentee ballot of the student who votes at his parents'
home for candidates too far away, too remote from his daily life in
the college town to concern him, is similarly restricted. The
"gained or lost" statute often grants only a right to cast a mean-
ingless ballot. If statutes which prevent students from voting at
their college residences are held unconstitutional, the student who
resides the greater part of his time in the college community
would lose the option of voting at his parents' residence. Like
other citizens, students then would have to establish voting resi-
dences at the places where they live and participate in the selec-
tion of those officeholders who in fact govern them.
Another difficulty with the equal protection argument against
exclusion of student voters is strong dictum in the case of Car-
rington v. Rash86 suggesting that a state may validly entertain a
rebuttable presumption against the voting residency of members
of mobile groups such as servicemen, students at colleges and
universities, patients in hospitals and civilian employees of the
Federal Government.8 7 Carrington held unconstitutional as viola-
tive of rights secured by the equal protection clause a Texas
constitutional provision absolutely barring servicemen from gain-
ing residency for voting purposes in any county other than the
one from which they entered military service. For military men
who had given up residence elsewhere and were for other pur-
poses Texas residents, this provision resulted in complete dis-
franchisement. But in striking down what was in effect an absolute
presumption against a serviceman's registrability, the opinion ap-
pears to approve of voting residency tests which go beyond actual
residence plus intent, to a consideration of other factors which
establish the elusive nexus between state and prospective voter:
But only where military personnel are involved has Texas
been unwilling to develop more precise tests to determine the.
bona fides of an individual claiming to have actually made his
home in the State long enough to vote. The State's law
reports disclose that there have been many cases where the
local election officials have determined the issue of bona fide
- 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
87 Id. at 95. "Students at colleges and universities in Texas, patients at hospitals and
other institutions within the State, and civilian employees of the United States Govern-
ment may be as transient as military personnel. But all of them are given at least an
opportunity to show the election officials that they are bona fide residents."
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residence.... The declarations of voters concerning their in-
tent to reside in the State and in a particular county is often
not conclusive; the election officials may look to the actual
facts and circumstances.""
However, this pronouncement may have lost some of its force
due to several historical and sociological factors. First, Justice
Stewart wrote the majority opinion in Carrington early in 1965.
Although the compelling state interest test had its genesis in the
reapportionment cases beginning with Reynolds in 1964, its emer-
gence as the basic device for gauging denial of equal protection in
the voter exclusion setting is a recent phenomenon which has
reached its full development in the post-Carrington years. 89
Moreover, as his dissents in Williams,9" Kramer,91 and Phoenix92
attest, Justice Stewart has yet to join the majority in applying the
compelling state interest test in the franchise denial cases. Fur-
thermore, students tend to be less mobile than military personnel.
A soldier's assignment at any given time is fortuitous; he stands
ready to move at any time pursuant to new orders taking little
cognizance of his residential preference. An average student, on
the other hand, chooses his college or university (and by inference
its seat) with reasonable care, and may spend anywhere from four
to eight years to the rest of his life in that community, depending
upon the degree(s) he seeks, his vocational objectives and the
state of the job market, to name a few of the relevant variables.
Available data indicate that college-trained persons as a group
tend to fall far behind groups such as migrant workers, operatives,
craftsmen and foremen in frequency of movement. 93 In any event,
proof of bona fide residency theoretically aims at assuring an
electorate that has a real interest in local community affairs.94
Students without particular local "causes" but interested enough
to register and vote have ample opportunity to familiarize them-
selves with the local issues through information generated during
the last weeks of intense campaigning before an election. Finally,
the issue of systematic exclusion of prospective student regis-
trants by application of a presumption against their status as
- 380 U.S. at 95.
89E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
90393 U.S. at 48.
91 395 U.S. at 634.
92399 U.S. at 215.
93 Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile
Society, 61 MicH. L. REV. 823, 830 n.10 (1963). For purposes of analogy, students are
considered with the "professional" group.
9477 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1964); Election Laws as Legal Roadblocks to Voting, supra
note 32, at 623.
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resident voters was not before the Court in Carrington, and the
dicta making specific reference to students was purely gratuitous.
One further analytical problem of some complexity confronts
the student challenging the local clerk's refusal to register him on
grounds of denial of equal protection. Every voting denial case
applying the compelling state interest test involved either ex-
clusion of certain classes from special purpose elections or total
exclusion from the franchise. For example, the enclave residents
in Evans could not vote anywhere, because having been denied
registration in Maryland, they were effectively disfranchised not
only from local and state elections, but from national elections as
well. In contrast, Michigan's "gained or lost" provision creates
only a presumption against students' gaining a voting residence. 95
It does not either conceptually or in fact work a total exclusion of
students from the franchise, but rather it requires students to vote
at their prior residences, generally their parents' homes.
Whereas instate students face formal disfranchisement only
from local elections, out-of-state students, whose parents move
while they are away at college, may find that the state residency
laws at their parents' new home prevent their registration since
they will not have been residents of that state for the three months
to a year normally required of voters in state and local elections. 96
Such persons may thus find themselves excluded from voting in
any state. As discussed above, the same result is reached where a
student severs his residency ties from his parents' state when that
state does not have the "gained or lost" saving provision. Al-
though only a small percentage of servicemen were totally denied
the right to vote anywhere, the Supreme Court treated Carrington
as a total disfranchisement problem. In its brief, Texas called the
Court's attention to the fact that every state and territory of the
United States permits its citizens to maintain residence during
absence in military service, and every state has laws providing for
absentee voting by citizens in the armed forces. 97 Thus, for most
servicemen, only denial of the vote in Texas was at stake in
Carrington.
Most students are faced only with a presumption against the
sufficiency of their residency for registration purposes. Yet, as the
95 See discussion in Part II of text supra.
96 E.g., N.Y. ELECTION LAW § 150 (McKinney Supp. 1970) (three months); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 168.492 (Supp. 1970) (six months); ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 12 (1959) (one
year). Title 11 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1973aa-73bb (Supp. 1971), abolishes such durational residency requirements as a
precondition for voting for President and Vice President. Its constitutionality was upheld
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Arizona, 91 S. Ct. 260 (1970).97 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, VOTING INFORMATION, Gen-6 (1964).
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discussion of McDonald and Williams above points out, any
attempt to justify student exclusion from the local franchise on the
ground they can vote elsewhere emphasizes form over sub-
stance. To deny an individual the right to vote on those issues and
for those officeholders that most directly affect his daily life would
seem to sever from the franchise its most meaningful element.
2. The Student's Interest in Voting at His College Resi-
dence-The relationship between "town and gown" has changed
dramatically since 1893 when Wolcott 98 was decided. Changes in
the numbers and life styles of today's university students contrib-
ute greatly to the more substantial nexus between the scholar and
the community, and to the scholar's enhanced interest in local
government affairs. Today there are over 5.8 million college stu-
dents.99 Two out of five students live in rental or private housing
of their own choosing. 100 Between 1965 and 1969, while the
number of college students grew by thirty-two percent, the num-
ber of full-time students working part-time grew by sixty-four
percent to 2.1 million.101 The burgeoning student populations and
the increased complexity of administration have resulted in a
drastic de-emphasis of the college's role in loco parentis.
Students have always been subject to local manifestations of
the police power such as traffic and parking regulations and liquor
control ordinances. Today's more independent students are also
likely to be concerned with such matters as health and building
code enforcement as it pertains to restaurants and rental housing,
and protection of individual liberties in the police procedure con-
text. These matters comprise an area over which locally elected
officials also exercise significant control. Although few students
own property in the locality, many pay local property taxes as a
part of their rents -an economic fact implicitly recognized by a
recent Michigan tax credit provision.10 2
Furthermore, the U.S. Census includes college students as
"1residents of the communities in which they were residing while
attending college."10 3 Since the Michigan Constitution 0 4 requires
9897 Mich. 361. 56 N.W. 837 (1893).
99 Parker, Statistics of Attendance in American Universities and Colleges, SCHOOL &
SOCIETY, Jan. 1970, at 41.
100 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, Series P-20, No. 183, at 4.
'c" N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1970, at I, col. 4.
1o2 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.258(2) (Supp. 1970) allows renters a credit against their
state income tax liabilities equal to a percentage of seventeen percent of gross rent paid.
This reflects a legislative determination as to the amount of the landlord's property tax
burden that is passed on to his tenants.
103 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COUNTY AND CITY
DATA BOOK xix (1967).
'04 MICH. CONST. art. 4, §§ 2, 3, 6.
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that the Federal Census be used as the basis for apportioning
state legislative districts, the state thus constitutionally recog-
nizes, albeit indirectly, that students reside in the various college
communities for voting apportionment purposes.
One man, one vote is, of course, the rule both in congressional
district apportionment'0 5 and in local government representation
apportionment, such as city council and county commissioner
districts. a0 6 "Apportionment... which contracts the value of
some votes and expands the value of others is uncon-
stitutional."' 0 7 In its latest congressional district apportionment
opinion, Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, s08 the Supreme Court reiterated
its "as nearly as practicable" equality of population standard for
all districts within a state. 09 In Kirkpatrick the Court rejected the
Missouri Attorney General's contention that variances of up to
three percent took into account pockets of students and military
personnel. Instead, the Court found the variances haphazard in
that Missouri took these classes into account on an arbitrary basis
while in fact seeking to achieve geographical compactness of
districts. The Court left open the question whether the eligible
voter population, rather than the total census population, would
be a constitutionally acceptable basis for apportionment. Three
years earlier, in Burns v. Richardson," the Court had approved
for interim use an Hawaii apportionment scheme based on regis-
tered voters. Hawaii census figures are particularly subject to
distortion owing to the large and fluctuating military presence
there. Citing Carrington, the opinion cautioned that any restric-
tions on otherwise qualified service personnel as such would be
impermissible."'"
Barring extenuating circumstances, apportionment based on the
latest census figures is the preferred and usual method. Because of
laws making student registration more difficult, numerous students
are denied the right to vote in districts where they are included in
the apportionment, and the value of other residents' votes in those
districts is increased. Correspondingly, the value of votes in dis-
tricts where large numbers of students no longer reside will de-
105 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
106Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). In this case involving county
commissioner districts, the Court held that the Constitution permits no substantial vari-
ation from equal population in drawing districts for units of local government having
general governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by such a body.
107 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 559 (1964).
108 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
109 Id. at 530.
110384 U.S. 73 (1966).
111 Id. at 95 n.25. "Such a restriction, [across the board exclusion of servicemen per se
from the franchise] if imposed by a State, would violate the Equal Protection Clause."
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crease. Such a situation patently violates the one man, one vote
principle. The voting system itself thus has an interest in avoiding
the unconstitutional result, by allowing qualified students to vote
where they in fact live.
Finally, two other interests, shared in theory by both students
and the political system itself, arise from the fact that at any given
time students constitute a fairly stable percentage of a college
town or county's population. Democratic theory seems to imply
that student political judgments, even if antithetical to permanent
residents, should enjoy political expression roughly equivalent to
the number of adherents. Secondly, the local jury array often
derives from the rolls of registered voters.' 12 A true cross-section
of veniremen thus becomes difficult or impossible to achieve
where most students are unable to register. Especially where a
student is on trial, the desirability of a cross-section of towns-
people is evident. 113 Both the students and the system therefore
have cogent interests in allowing eligible students to vote at their
college residences.
3. The State's Interest in the Exclusion of Student Voters-
Fear that student voters may try to vote both at their parents'
residence and at their college locale is one justification for re-
fusal to register students in their college communities. 114 Pre-
vention of plural voting and guaranteeing purity of the ballot box
are important state and local concerns, and in an earlier era the
danger of election fraud was real indeed. 115 Today, however, the
voter registration system probably has the capacity to minimize
the danger of double voting should students be enrolled en masse
by the various college locales. For example, the Michigan voter
registration law provides a thirty day moratorium before an elec-
tion during which time registrations are not valid for that elec-
112 See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.1202 (1968).
113 In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), the Court stated that the jury should
be truly representative of the community. Exclusion of women from federal jury arrays
was held improper in Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). Exclusion of day
laborers was likewise prohibited in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
However, in two five to four decisions, the Supreme Court upheld disproportionate
representation of the wealthy in state cases. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947);
Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948). The majority contended that the sixth
amendment right to jury trial was not applicable to the states. The dissent argued that it
was and that "there is a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a group which represents
a cross-section of the community." 332 U.S. at 299. Finally, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 39 1
U.S. 145 (1968), the Court held that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial applied to
the states. At least one circuit held that the "cross-section" standard applied to the states'
juries even before Duncan was decided. See Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 7 19-20 (5th
Cir. 1966).
114 Wilkins v. Ann Arbor City Clerk, 24 Mich. App. 422, 427, 180 N.W.2d 395, 397
(1970).
115 Goldman, Move-Lose Your Vote, 45 NAT'L. MUN. REV. 6,7 (1956).
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tion."1 6 Additionally, existing registration forms could be con-
structed so as to elicit pertinent facts suitable for verifying the
legitimacy of a particular registration, e.g., by cross-checking with
the home town or other registrars." 7
A second rationale for exclusion of potential student voters is
the perceived threat of political takeover by a bloc of voters not
indigenous to the community nor sympathetic to its long-term
needs. While understandable, this justification is both con-
stitutionally and factually untenable. The State of Texas argued
vigorously in Carrington that its prohibition was necessary to
prevent "military takeover" by commanding officers who would
influence or control their men's votes." 8 The Court rejected this
contention:
'Fencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population
because of the way they may vote is constitutionally imper-
missible. '[T]he exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance
of democratic institutions,'.., cannot constitutionally be ob-
literated because of a fear of the political views of a particular
group of bona fide residents. Yet, that is what Texas claims to
have done here. 119
Even apart from the constitutional question, the possibility of
student bloc voting has not been proven where a college commu-
nity actually facilitated student voting.' 20 A recent American
Council on Education survey of college freshmen showing that
forty-four percent considered themselves liberal and twenty per-
cent moderate conservative demonstrates that students would not
vote as a solid unit but in fact fairly approximate the voting
patterns of the national electorate. 121
A more substantial local interest in excluding students may be
to assure an informed electorate. The argument is that if students
116 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.497 (Supp. 1970). The possibility that a large
number of young people will move into that community in order to swing a close election
in a college town is obviated since those wishing to register must have satisfied the local
durational residency requirement approximately a month before the election.
117 Each state could provide, albeit at great expense, a central data bank where in-
formation set down by registrants on a standard form could be stored and cross-checked
electronically. Each central bank would in turn have to be linked with its counterparts in
the other states.
118 380 U.S. at 93.
119 Id. at 94.
120 Since 1967, Iowa City registration officials have not challenged students seeking to
register. As a result, students at the University of Iowa voted in the presidential election of
1968 and are eligible to vote in all local elections. "There have not as yet been any proven
harmful effects on the community from freely allowing the students to vote." Election
Laws as Legal Roadblocks to Voting, supra note 32, at 634.
121 N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1970, at 16, col. 4.
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are permitted to vote in local elections only when they can show a
greater interest in the community than that evidenced simply by
attendance at a local university, then the community can guaran-
tee itself concerned electors. However, as discussed above in
Kramer,22 Cipriano,l2 3 Phoenix,2 4 and Evans,125 the Supreme
Court has repeatedly found insufficiently compelling the state
interest in excluding classes of otherwise qualified voters allegedly
having a lesser stake in the outcome than others. Moreover, as
indicated in the discussion of the above four cases, most student
voters have as substantial an interest in voting as did the particu-
lar class excluded from the electorate in each case.
Where qualifications for voting and instate university tuition
rates are the same, the state has a large practical stake in restrict-
ing the numbers of those enjoying the very favorable instate
rates. This type of interest, however, is undoubtedly an
insufficient basis for denying the franchise. In any event, an an-
swer to this potential dilemma may be to create a statutory dis-
tinction between residency for voting purposes and residency for
tuition assessment purposes, something Colorado has already
done.12 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Students who desire to participate in the government of their
college communities must first be able to register and vote. Chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the presumption against student
residency involves several difficult though not insuperable prob-
lems. With respect to the due process issue, students will be
hard-pressed to prove that state law vests uncontrolled discretion
in local registrars. In Michigan, case law will probably have
formulated just enough judicial guidance to make the matter of the
clerk's unfettered discretion a very close question. Here the pre-
sumption of validity attaching to state legislation looms large.
Also, where the students do in fact have the option of absentee
voting in local elections "back home" they cannot claim absolute
disfranchisement as did the blacks in Louisiana and Schnell. Thus
students must argue that the registrars, by denying them the
122 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
123 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
124 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
398 U.S. 419 (1970).126 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-3-4 (1963) provides:
"(3) No provision in this section [(2) of which deals with student voter qualifications] shall
apply in the determination of residence or non-residence status of students for any college
or university purpose." See generally Comment, Nonresident Tuition Charged by State
Universities in Review, 38 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 341 (1970).
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electoral opportunity to determine the issues and officeholders
that affect them most, are denying them the right to vote in any
meaningful sense. However, should the students succeed in con-
vincing the courts of this, two factors begin to work in their favor.
First, the burden of justifying the exclusion of this class of poten-
tial electors is with the state which, secondly, must show a com-
pelling interest underlying the discrimination. By any criteria
which the Supreme Court has thus far suggested, 127 most if not all
students have the requisite amount of attachment to, or interest
in, their college communities. The state's interests in excluding
the student vote, though once viable, seem no longer compelling,
especially when the state's interests are weighed against the sig-
nificant student interests in voting at their place of residence. As
analyzed above, the state's objections to student voting are either
no longer tenable, or can be effectively remedied through means
other than the crude device of excluding students as a class.
Should the Court adopt this analysis, it would probably con-
clude that the state interest in exclusion of student voters is
insufficiently compelling, hence violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Unless and until the Court
so decides, the promises and prospects of student political power
inherent in title III of the Voting Rights Act cannot be put to the
test, and the unanswered question of whether students will ever
amount to a viable force in our scheme of self-government will
remain largely unanswered.
W. Perry Bullard
and
James A. Rice
127 Such criteria emerges from Kramer, Evans, Cipriano and Phoenix in which cases the
Court found that the state's interest in excluding a particular class of otherwise qualified
voters was insufficiently compelling or the method used was unconstitutionally imprecise.
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APPENDIX I
SAMPLE STUDENT VOTER REGISTRATION QUESTIONNAIRES
A. Form employed by the registration clerks at Ann Arbor, Mich-
igan- seat of the University of Michigan.
IF YOU ARE A STUDENT PLEASE ANSWER THE FOL-
LOWING QUESTIONS WHICH BEAR UPON YOUR
QUALIFICATIONS TO REGISTER
1. Do you have a fixed intent to return to the home of your
parents or guardian upon completion of your studies here? -
2. Are you married and living with your spouse in Ann Arbor? -
3. What percentage of your total support as a student is derived
from:
A. Scholarships, Fellowships, employment, savings or loans
in your name
B. Parents
C. Other (specify)
4. A. Are you employed in the Ann Arbor Area?---
B. How many hours per week do you work?
5. Do you own any property in Ann Arbor upon which you pay
real or personal property tax?
6. A. Do you intend during the current academic year to spend
the off term at the address of your parents?
B. If you do not intend to spend the off term at the address of
your parents, will you be living in Ann Arbor during the off
term?
7. Are there any other facts which you wish to state in support of
your qualifications to vote?- - ---------
AFFIDAVIT
I hereby swear or affirm that the statements made herein in
support of my qualifications to register as an elector in the City of
Ann Arbor are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, and
that I believe I am qualified under State Law to be a registered
elector.
Signature
Date
--------------------------------
Signature of Registration Officer
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B. Form employed by the registration clerks at Kalamazoo,
Michigan-seat of Western Michigan University and Kala-
mazoo College.
If you are a student, please answer the following questions
which bear upon your qualifications to register for voting pur-
poses in Kalamazoo:
1. Are you married and living with your spouse in Kalamazoo?
2. Do you own any real estate property in the City of Kala-
mazoo?-------------- ----
3. Are you self-supporting?
(Note: Fellowships, scholarships, and loans taken out in your
name which you are legally obligated to pay are regarded as
evidences of self-support).
4. Are you employed in the Kalamazoo Area?
If "yes," how many hours per week do you work? ----
5. What home address is shown on the records at the University
or College you attend?
6. Do you intend during the current academic year to continue
your residence in Kalamazoo during the off term? ---
If not, where will you reside?
7. Are there any other facts which you wish to state in support of
your qualifications to vote in this City? -
If you do not agree with the interpretation given on your
qualifications to vote, you have the right to speak with the City
Clerk and/or State Elections Director for further interpretation
of your qualifications.
AFFIDAVIT
I hereby swear or affirm that the statements made herein in
support of my qualifications to register as an elector in the City
of Kalamazoo are true and correct to the best of my knowl-
edge, and that I believe I am qualified under State law to be a
registered elector.
Signature
Date
Signature of Registration Officer
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C. Affidavit prepared by the Michigan Director of Elections for
use by the registration clerks at Ypsilanti, Michigan-seat of
Eastern Michigan University. Also letter from the Director of
Elections to the city clerk outlining the purposes to be served
through use of such affidavit.
DECLARATION OF RESIDENCE.
620
STATE OF MICHIGAN, ) SS.County of
DECLARATION OF
RESIDENCE
1,, hereby declare that I am a bonafide
resident of the State of Michigan and of the City-Township of_
(Strike One)
and that I have no other home with my parents or elsewhere.
(The above spaces may be used for additional information as needed.)
I make this declaration for the purpose of securing registration for voting in the
aforesaid City- Township.
(Strike One)
I understand that a false declaration made for this purpose constitutes perjury.
(Section 933, Michigan Election Law)
(Signature)
Subscribed and sworn before me, this day of__ 19
Clerk.
August 5, 1965
Hon. Betty E. Fenker
Ypsilanti City Clerk
304 N. Huron Street
Ypsilanti, Michigan 48197
Dear Miss Fenker:
Your problem in a college city as to the registration of students is
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one with which I am somewhat familiar, as we continually have
the problem in East Lansing and Ann Arbor.
Actually, I think you are entirely justified in requiring the appli-
cant to sign and swear to an affidavit as to their circumstances.
While many of them are probably qualified to register and vote, I
am perfectly aware that out-of-state students wish to register in
the hopes they may avoid paying the additional tuition. I think the
only clear statement of the rule is the one which you refer to in
your third listing in which the courts said that if it is their home
and they have no other to which to return in case of marital
difficulty, sickness or distress, they are as much qualified to ac-
quire residence and vote as any other person. There probably is
no one, including you and I, who does not have a relative that
would take us in, in case of extreme sickness but a general
application of this rule is the one that I believe applies.
I am considering preparing an affidavit form that might be used by
you and other clerks in similar circumstances with a copy of the
law found on page 251 in Compiler's Section 795, indicating that
a false statement would be a felony. I believe this would automat-
ically eliminate quite a few students.
I am sorry there is not a really simple rule.
Sincerely,
Robert M. Montgomery
Director of Elections
RMM/yh
D. Form employed by the registration clerks at East Lansing,
Michigan-seat of Michigan State University
CITY OF EAST LANSING
VOTER REGISTRATION AFFIDAVIT
I hereby swear or affirm that the statements made herein in
support of my qualifications to register as an elector in the City of
East Lansing are true and correct to the best of my knowledge:
That I am a citizen of the United States
I am at least 21 years of age or will be on
19-_ Month Day
I have lived in the State at least six months, and I have lived in
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the City of East Lansing for at least 30 days or will have before
19-_
Month Day
I have, at the time of applying for registration "on or before the
5th Friday preceding the election," established the City of East
Lansing as my residence as defined by the following criteria:
a. This is the location at which I habitually sleep and keep my
personal belongings,
b. This is the place at which I reside the greater portion of the
time,
c. I have no other legal residence, as evidenced by such docu-
ments as my drivers license or automobile certification,
d. I have no intention to return to a prior residence or location
which I consider my home or residence,
e. I have not voted by absentee ballot in any other State
election within the last six months.
PLEASE NOTE: Michigan Election Law provides as follows:
"Any person who makes a false affidavit or swears falsely while
under oath for the purpose of securing registration or for the
purpose of voting at any election or primary election shall be
deemed guilty of perjury."
The penalty for perjury is a fine not to exceed $ 1,000, or impris-
onment for a term not to exceed 5 years, or both.
Signature of Applicant
Date
Signature of Registration Officer
NOTE: Michigan Election Law provides that the Registration
Clerk may, if he chooses require the applicant to answer under
oath any questions relating to the truth of the statements con-
tained in the affidavit.
E. Detroit, Michigan, seat of the University of Detroit, Wayne
State University and various other colleges requires no special
information of student registrants. If a person has a sleeping
residence in the city more than half of the year, he is entitled to
register and vote.
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